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THEN, NOW, AND AL
Nicholas Wolterstorff

In this article I review some of the more important developments in philosophy of the past fifty years with the aim of pointing out the contribution that
the work of Alvin Plantinga has made to these developments. Along the way
I also highlight the most important enduring themes in Plantinga’s work.

My project in this essay is first to describe what philosophy was like in the
1950s, when Al Plantinga was a graduate student and entered the ranks
of professional philosophers, and then to pinpoint the contribution his
work has made to the difference between philosophy then and now. I will
forego describing what philosophy is like today. Most readers of this essay
will already know what philosophy is like today. As for those who do not,
a fairly good picture of the relevant parts of philosophy will emerge in the
course of our discussion.
Though what I say will necessarily incorporate a synopsis of some of
the highpoints of Al’s work, my aim is not to give a synopsis—others have
done that—but to make a foray into the dark and treacherous area of historical influence. I will try to identify actual influence; I will not engage in
counterfactual speculations. I will not ask how philosophy today would
have been different had Al not existed, or how it would have been different had he become, say, a Freudian therapist or a Wall Street banker
instead of a philosopher.
I should make clear the vantage point from which I will be speaking.
Al and I have known each other since the fall of 1950, when we were sophomores together at Calvin College. So when I describe what philosophy
was like in the 1950s, I am basing my description on what I have experienced, not on historical research. This is what it felt like. And given that
we entered philosophy at the same time, when I describe the contribution
Al’s work has made to the difference between philosophy then and now, I
will be describing developments we both have lived through. I will try to
describe them in such a way that even those who know little if anything
about them will be able to follow most of what I say.
Editor’s Note: A version of this essay was initially presented at the Alvin Plantinga Retirement Celebration at the University of Notre Dame on May 22, 2010. It was first published
in Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Kelly
James Clark and Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and is reprinted here
with the kind permission of Oxford University Press.
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Not only have Al and I known each other since the fall of 1950; we
have been close friends ever since. It was, as I recall, friendship at first
sight. We then taught together at Yale in the academic year 1957–58; and
we were colleagues on the faculty of Calvin from 1963–1982. So though I
aim to make my description of Al’s influence on philosophy accurate and
not over-stated, I do not pretend that it is objective. And I will continue
to refer to the subject of my narrative not as Professor Plantinga, nor as
Plantinga, nor even as Alvin, but as Al—no disrespect intended!
What was the ethos of American philosophy in the 1950s? If I am successful in my description, the ethos of those times will seem strange,
alien, and unfamiliar to every philosopher under the age of sixty; the
change over these fifty some years has been enormous. My description
will fit Harvard, where I was a grad student, somewhat better than it fits
Yale, where Al was a grad student; Yale was old-fashioned in those days,
not quite up to speed. But once Al left grad school and began teaching at
Wayne State, the ethos in which he found himself was more or less the
same as that in which I had found myself as a grad student at Harvard.
What Richard Rorty called “the linguistic turn” in philosophy was in
full flower at Harvard and elsewhere in the mid-1950s. Previously, philosophers in the analytic tradition had typically described what they were doing as “conceptual analysis.” Now the talk was all about language. Quine
was giving the lectures that eventuated in his book Word and Object. J. L.
Austin was visiting at Harvard and giving the lectures that eventuated
in his book How to Do Things with Words. Charles Stevenson was visiting
and lecturing on the language of ethics. Shortly Monroe Beardsley would
publish his book, Aesthetics, on the language of art criticism. There was
no course at Harvard on philosophy of religion, none that caught my attention, anyway; but there was talk in the air about religious language.
In 1955 there appeared the collection edited by Flew and MacIntyre, New
Essays in Philosophical Theology. The title is misleading. With few exceptions
the essays are not about God; they are worried reflections on whether it is
possible to speak about God.
When it came to philosophy of science, the talk was hardly at all about
the language of science but instead about the logic of science. People in
the field took for granted that there is such a thing as the logic of science
and declared that it was the task of philosophers to extract that logic and
show that it really is the logic of science. This was thought to be mindcrackingly difficult, requiring supreme intelligence; much of science did
not appear to have the logic that one knew it must have. We at Harvard
had many talks on what was called “the problem of the counterfactual.” It
was a very hard problem.
The core idea concerning the logic of science was that scientists form
hypotheses for which they then seek experiential verification—or, on the
main alternative view, for which they then seek experiential falsification.
The old view, that they do or should form their hypotheses by induction,
was widely rejected. Let me remind those readers who find this all quite
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naïve that this was before the days of Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Van
Fraassen et al.
Philosophers of science talked a bit, but not much, about the nature of
the perceptual experience that supposedly verifies or falsifies scientific
hypotheses; it fell to epistemologists to place the nature of perceptual experience at the center of their enterprise and to give an account of how
perceptual experience imparts justification to perceptual judgments. As
to the former of these topics, the nature of perceptual experience, sensedata theory dominated the field. It was widely held that that of which one
is aware in perception is not external objects, such as cats and dogs, but
sense-data. There was much discussion as to just what a sense-datum is
and as to the reason for thinking there are such things. As to the latter
of the topics mentioned, how perceptual experience imparts justification
to perceptual judgments, the theory employed for discussing the matter
was classical foundationalism. That this was the theory employed was not
clear to anyone at the time, however. No one had yet identified classical
foundationalism as a distinct epistemological position and held it up for
critique; it was simply taken for granted.
Let me be candid here and declare that I found the epistemology of
the time to be a crashing bore. Not that I already knew the answers to the
questions being posed; I had no interest in the questions. Whether or not
there is an external world was a question that did not vex me; the much
discussed “problem of the speckled hen” never engaged me; and I found
that I could live happily without figuring out how sense-data are related
to the surfaces of objects.
As to logic proper, though the Harvard philosopher/ logician C. I. Lewis
had written his treatise on modal logic, modal logic did not enter into any
logic course that was on offer. Nobody took account of it. That was because
the concepts of necessity and possibility were suspect; philosophers didn’t
know what to make of them. Quine proposed that necessary truths are
those that we would give up only as a last resort; and he held that the best
that can be made of the traditional doctrine that a thing possesses certain
of its properties necessarily is that this is a matter of how one describes or
identifies the thing; his example was, cyclists can be said to be necessarily
two-legged but not necessarily rational. Such views did not prompt deep
thought about necessity and possibility.
I mentioned that in philosophy of science the talk was mainly not about
the language of science but about the logic of science; so too in epistemology,
the talk was mainly not about language. Yet when it came to ethics, aesthetics, and religion, the talk was all about language. Why the difference?
It was the influence of logical positivism that accounted for the difference. Logical positivism was in its hey-day, even though, as we would
soon learn, its death was imminent. Central to the positivist movement
was the claim that in uttering a sentence, one has made a genuine assertion only if one has said something that is either analytically true or false,
or empirically verifiable. If one has not made a genuine assertion, then, so
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said the early positivists, one’s utterance is meaningless. They were fond
of culling sentences from Heidegger to illustrate their point, such as “The
nothing negates itself.” This is not an analytic truth or falsehood; neither
is it something that one could verify. So it’s meaningless.
Examples such as this throw one off the track, however. By the mid-1950s
we were all aware of the fact that the term “meaningless” as employed by
the positivists was a term of art. It was not their view that everything that
failed their test was jabberwocky—meaningless in that sense—nor was it
their view that one should never make utterances that fail their test. They
just meant that one had not made an assertion, a true-false claim; one’s
utterance lacked assertoric meaning.
It was near-universally agreed that much if not most of the language of
ethics, of art criticism, and of religion fails the positivist test of assertoric
meaning; we do not use such sentences to make true-false claims. That’s
why the rush was on to identify the sort of meaning that utterances in
these areas do have. Some of the proposals that emerged were strange,
such as R. M. Hare’s suggestion that when a religious person uses Godtalk, she is expressing what Hare called a “blik.” And some were truly
silly, such as the suggestion that when I say, “It was wrong of you to deceive her the way you did,” what I am doing is boo-ing your deception.
“You deceived her; boo to you!” The eighteenth-century Scots philosopher
Thomas Reid, with his incomparable talent and penchant for mordant wit,
would have had a field day had he had such material to work with. All he
had was Hume.
I mentioned that though logical positivism was in its hey-day in the
1950s, its death was imminent. Never has a philosophical movement collapsed so suddenly and totally. Collapsed within philosophy, that is. To
this day one sometimes hears intellectuals, and academics outside philosophy, announcing as the obvious truth of the matter positions which,
in their essentials, are the same as those of the logical positivists. Partly
this is due, I suppose, to the lingering influence of positivism; but partly
it is due, I think, to the fact that the positivists were articulating a line of
thought that lies deep in the mentality of modernity. Be that as it may,
within philosophy, collapse it did. Some fifteen years ago I assigned my
students to read parts of Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic as preparation
for discussing Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion. They disliked it intensely. They found it impossible to take Ayer’s views seriously; they talked about them as one would talk about some musty old-fashioned items
that one comes across in the attic. And they found Ayer’s tone unbearably
arrogant. It’s a different day.
Now I move from description to story: from my description of the
philosophical ethos of those bygone days, to my narrative of influence. Al
titled his first book, published in 1967, God and Other Minds.1 Notice: not
God-talk, but God. Today, more than forty years later, it is almost impossible
Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).
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to appreciate what a bold move this was. The air at the time was buzzing with talk about God-talk, it being widely assumed that such talk does
something other than refer to, and make claims about, God. A young philosopher then stepped into this buzz and announced a book about God.
The book proved to be as influential as it was bold. Shortly it was only
the Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion who talked much about Godtalk; the others talked about God.
I said that the book is not about God-talk. That’s true, but a bit misleading. The book contained an acute attack on the positivist criterion for
assertoric meaning, and Al drew out the implications of that attack for our
understanding of religious language. But it’s clear that the only reason this
discussion of religious language is there is that Al judged that many readers would not take seriously his claim to be making claims about God if
he did not first dispose of the positivist reason for holding that we cannot
make claims about God.2 Of course, removing the positivist strictures on
talk about God leaves one with Kant’s strictures on judgments about God.
But those strictures have never gained much purchase among analytic
philosophers. They presuppose Kant’s doctrine that what is given to us in
awareness (intuition) is in no respect reality as it is in itself but only reality
as it appears to us, along with Kant’s doctrine of experience as categorically structured by the mind; and most analytic philosophers have never
found those doctrines persuasive.
I said that the book was about God—not about God-talk but about God.
That too is a bit misleading; it gives the impression that the book is an essay
in philosophical theology, and strictly speaking it’s not. God and Other
Minds, to quote its subtitle, is “A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief
in God.” The main argument is a parity argument: if it’s rational to believe
in other (human) minds, then it’s rational to believe in God; it is rational
to believe in other (human) minds; therefore it’s rational to believe in God.
The book played a decisive role in changing the main topic in analytic
philosophy of religion from religious language to the epistemology of religious belief. The epistemology of religious belief has continued ever since
to be a major topic within analytic philosophy of religion.
It’s easy to see why Al wanted to change the topic from religious language. Adherence to the positivists’ verifiability criterion gave urgency to
the topic of religious language; reject that criterion, and the urgency dissipates. But why change the topic to the rational justification of religious
belief? Of all the topics one might discuss instead of religious language,
why that?
I sometimes hear it said about Al’s work that while he is a philosophical systematician par excellence, he has a tin ear for cultural trends and
mind-sets and for the role that philosophy can play in identifying and critiquing those. I regard this as flat-out mistaken. In choosing to talk about
the rational justification of theistic belief, Al was not just selecting a topic
2

Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 156–157.
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on which he anticipated being able to hone and display his talents as a
systematician; he was engaging a charge against theistic belief in general,
and against Christian belief in particular, that runs deep in the mindset of
modernity—the charge that it’s not rational to hold such beliefs. Once one
has disposed of the positivist charge that God-talk is assertorically meaningless, one is face-to-face with that much older and more enduring charge
that it’s not rational to hold beliefs about God. Responding to this charge
has proved to be one of the main themes in Al’s work as a whole; I would
say that it is the main theme. God and Other Minds was his first go at it.
Let me say something here about the term “rational.” After God and Other
Minds, Al has increasingly shied away from using the term “rational”
in the broad, catch-all sense in which he used it there. I think his reasons
for shying away from using the term in that broad sense when developing
his own epistemology are good reasons; I share them. But from God and
Other Minds forward, Al has dealt with one and another form of the charge
that there is something defective about theistic belief. That charge is typically expressed by saying that it’s not rational to hold theistic beliefs; one
of my Yale colleagues once remarked that religious believers suffer from
a “rationality deficit.” We need the term if we are to identify the multifaceted charge.
Whereas God and Other Minds changed the main topic in philosophy of
religion from religious language to religious epistemology, Al’s 1983 essay
“Reason and Belief in God,” along with a few essays on the same topic
that preceded it, changed the field of epistemology itself. Let me briefly
rehearse how that went.
In God and Other Minds, Al had plunged ahead to defend the rational
justifiedness of beliefs in God; in the essay “Reason and Belief in God,” he
took a step back and asked why it is so often said that beliefs about God
are not rationally justified. No one says that about perceptual beliefs, about
memory beliefs, about beliefs concerning other minds, etc. The answer Al
proposed was that two assumptions were being made. It was widely assumed that to be rationally justified, such beliefs must be held on the basis
of adequate propositional evidence; call this the evidentialist thesis concerning theistic beliefs. And it was assumed by the critics that those who hold
theistic beliefs do not meet the requirement; they do not hold them on the
basis of adequate propositional evidence. Having identified the assumptions, Al went on to ask whether they are true. In particular, is the evidentialist thesis concerning theistic beliefs true? Might it be that some beliefs
about God are instead what Al called “properly basic”—that is, basic and
properly so? Nowadays students in introductory philosophy of religion
courses toss about with great facility the terms “evidentialism” and “properly basic,” often to the puzzlement of those outside the field; the terms now
belong to the patois of the discipline. It was not so before the early 1980s.
I am not aware of any philosopher of the twentieth century who clearly
identified the evidentialist thesis concerning theistic belief and subjected
it to critical appraisal before Al did so in those papers from the late 1970s
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and early 1980s. Most writers have simply taken the thesis for granted and
worked out one and another kind of response. Some happily declared that
theistic beliefs fail to meet the requirement and are thus irrational. Of those
not willing to take this road, some tried to marshal adequate evidence,
others proposed reducing theistic belief to the point where the evidence
available was adequate, and many tried to execute an end-run around the
thesis by declaring that ostensibly theistic beliefs are not really about God
but about values, about religious experience, about the conditions of consciousness, about a way of living, about being authentic, about a blik—take
your pick. Al’s question cut through all this restless thrashing about. Is the
assumption that’s being made true, namely, that theistic belief is rational
only if held on the basis of adequate propositional evidence?
Once the thesis had been identified and clearly stated, it became possible
to ask whether there were any significant thinkers in the modern period
who had not joined the crowd. Al himself, in the 1983 essay, pointed to some
Reformed theologians of the late nineteenth century who did not accept
the evidentialist thesis, which is why he called his position “Reformed
epistemology.” Recently some have argued, convincingly in my view, that
Kant did not accept the thesis. But I would say that the non-acceptance of
the evidentialist thesis by these earlier thinkers was more intuitive than
systematic; none of them did what Al did, namely, clearly identify and critically appraise the thesis.
Al did more than pose the question; he argued for a negative answer.
His argument came in two parts. Let me save discussion of the second
part of the argument for later and focus here on the first part. Al asked
whether it was possible to discern in some writers an argument, implicit
if not explicit, in favor of the evidentialist thesis concerning theistic belief.
For example, might the thesis be the application to theistic beliefs of a
more general epistemological position that the writer held? Indeed it is, Al
concluded. Classical foundationalism has been widely embraced as a general epistemological position; evidentialism concerning theistic beliefs is
an application of this general position. So the question becomes: is classical foundationalism true? Al argued forcefully in “Reason and Belief in
God” that it is not.
It’s my impression that Al was the first to identify and clearly formulate
classical foundationalism as a distinct epistemological position. But I’m
not sure about that, nor do I know whether it was he or someone else who
coined the term “foundationalism.” It’s possible that the idea and the term
were both in the air at the time. But priorities don’t really matter. The late
70s, the 80s, and the 90s represented an extraordinary outburst of creativity in the field of analytic epistemology. At the center of the ferment were
discussions concerning foundationalism and its alternatives. And Al’s
critique of classical foundationalism made a decisive contribution to this
discussion. The field was transformed. What had seemed to me as a grad
student tedious and boring was now full of excitement. Al’s contribution
to the field culminated with his magisterial three volumes on warrant,
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published in 1993 and 2000, in which he moved decisively out of the attack
mode and developed, with great rigor and rich detail, a distinct account
of the nature of knowledge, the so-called proper functioning account. That
account now has the status of being a canonical contribution to the field.
Let me summarize my narrative thus far: What began, with God and
Other Minds, as a changing of the topic within philosophy of religion from
religious language to religious epistemology, blossomed out over the next
thirty years into a creative and transformative contribution to an entire
philosophical sub-discipline, viz., epistemology. Perhaps others have contributed as much to changing the field of epistemology from what it was
then to what it is now. But no one has contributed more.
Let me at this point express a perplexed annoyance that I have long felt
toward people outside the field of analytic philosophy with respect to the
developments I have been tracing. Every now and then one still hears the
old bromide that religious belief is irrational and should, for that reason,
be kept out of the university. The new atheist Sam Harris, for example, continues to spout the most juvenile form of evidentialism. And even those
philosophers and other academics who write seriously about faith and
reason often exhibit no acquaintance whatsoever with developments in
analytic epistemology over these past forty years. I submit that if you want
to talk about rationality in general, or about the rationality of religious
belief in particular, you must engage analytic epistemology of the past forty
years; everything else pales in comparison. And as for the thousands of
students and professors who loudly trumpet that they are postmodernist
anti-foundationalists and who assume without question that to be an antifoundationalist is to be an anti-realist, they have paid no attention whatsoever to the rigorous and creative articulation of non-foundationalist realism
by analytic philosophers over these past forty years.
Why are these important developments so often ignored? I don’t know.
It’s characteristic of analytic philosophers to remain close to the ground,
treating examples and counter-examples with great seriousness. Does
that bore people? Do most people prefer soaring generalizations? Or is it
perhaps the “dry style” of analytic philosophy that turns people off? Do
they want from philosophers something more literary, more ironic, more
metaphorical, more hyperbolic, more rhetorically arresting? I don’t know.
Back to the narrative. The line of the story that I have told thus far is
lean and elegant, with few complications; it sweeps from God and Other
Minds through “Reason and Belief in God” to the third volume of the series on warrant, Warranted Christian Belief.3 The story I am now about to tell
is different. Though it’s the story of Al’s influence on three distinct areas
of philosophy, it cannot be told as three stories but has to be told as one
story with three distinct interacting story lines.
Where to begin? Perhaps with the connection between one of these
story lines and the story already told. I remarked earlier that a theme
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

3

THEN, NOW, AND AL

261

which bids fair to be regarded as the dominant theme in Al’s writing is
the theme of responding to the charge that theistic belief in general, and
Christian belief in particular, is irrational. Sometimes the charge being
made is that the holding of theistic belief is in one way or another epistemically deficient; that’s the charge on which my narrative has focused
thus far. But sometimes the charge being made is rather that the content
of theistic belief is in some way intellectually defective: inconsistent, incoherent, or whatever. In the mid-twentieth century, the problem of evil was
typically framed as a challenge of this latter sort. Classic theism holds that
God is all good, all knowing, and all powerful. The claim was made that it
is impossible that there be such a being and that there also be the amount
and kind of evil in the world that in fact there is. Something has to give.
Beginning with an essay in the mid-1960s, and continuing into a number of essays since, Al employed the so-called free will defense to respond
to this charge.4 Thereby he located himself within a long tradition; the
free will defense goes back into antiquity. But his way of articulating the
tradition gave it a depth and sophistication it had never had before. His
contribution to discussion of the problem of evil is now classic.
What did he do that was new? Several things. But most important, he
made creative use of the idea of possible worlds. Though the idea of possible worlds goes back into Leibniz in the seventeenth century, for around
three centuries nobody did much with the idea. Philosophers who spoke
of possible worlds did so in an off-hand informal way. Then in 1963 Saul
Kripke published a ground-breaking article in which he employed the
idea of possible but non-actual objects to develop a semantics of modal
logic; this provided a way of thinking about necessity and possibility that
was, as I noted earlier, completely missing in our graduate school days. In
his 1974 publication The Nature of Necessity,5 Al took some of Kripke’s core
ideas and developed them in terms of possible worlds. Thinking in terms
of possible worlds is now part of the mainstream of analytic philosophy,
fundamental to what makes philosophy now very different from what
it was then. Many philosophers have contributed to this development.
Al, along with his and my near-contemporary, the late David Lewis, was
among the earliest and most influential.
Let me take a small detour here. When I was describing the philosophical ethos of the 1950s, I said nothing about metaphysics. I was a student of
D. C. Williams at Harvard. Williams was a superb analytic metaphysician;
I learned recently that some of his essays are now included in standard anthologies of metaphysics. Al was a student of Paul Weiss at Yale; Weiss was
a metaphysician of the old speculative school. So there were people doing
constructive metaphysics. But both of us were well aware of the fact that in
studying metaphysics we were outliers, working on the fringe; metaphysics was far from where the action was. The demise of positivism opened
4
5

See especially God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1977).
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
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the doors to metaphysics; possible worlds thinking stormed through those
doors and gave a huge boost to metaphysics generally. An important part
of what makes philosophy now very different from what it was then is the
prominence of metaphysics now compared to its near-absence then.
Detour ended. At the same time that he was working out a general
account of necessity, possibility, and essence in terms of possible worlds,
Al employed these ideas in his free will defense. He employed them in
another domain as well, viz., in philosophical theology proper. In his brief
1980 book Does God Have a Nature?, he employed them in discussing the
traditional doctrine of God’s simplicity.6 Fifteen years earlier he had employed them in his book titled The Ontological Argument.7 I think the title
is misleading. It’s my view that there is no such thing as the ontological
argument for the existence of God; there’s a family of such arguments, of
which Al’s is an ingenious contemporary member. At some points in the
book, Al talks as if his argument is an interpretation of Anselm’s original
argument; I think that’s one of the least plausible things he has said in
print. His own ontological argument is none the worse for that, however.
These books are just two of the many important contributions Al has
made to what has become the enormously rich field of philosophical theology.8 Once the positivist strictures about talking about God were removed, philosophical theology flourished as it has not since the middle
ages. A number of writers have noted that theologians have been wary
of this development; I myself get the impression that some theologians
would prefer that positivism or Kantianism still ruled the roost. I have no
plausible explanation for why this is.
Some of you may be forming the conclusion that every significant development in philosophy over these past fifty years bears on it the fingerprints of Alvin Plantinga. Not so. Political philosophy has flourished
over the past fifty years; Al has contributed nothing to that. There have
been important developments in ethics; Al has played no role in those. But
as for philosophy of religion and the central disciplines of epistemology
and metaphysics, his fingerprints are indeed everywhere. Not only his, of
course; but his as much as anyone’s.
How shall we place Al’s publications of the past fifteen or so years on
the relation between religion and science? We don’t yet know what the
long-term impact of these will be. One aspect of the short-term impact is
very clear, however: he has gotten some people very angry. It’s often been
claimed in recent years that science in general, and evolutionary theory in
particular, provides reasons for thinking that theism is false; the strident
voice of Richard Dawkins is prominent in the chorus. Al has been arguing
that neither evolutionary theory in particular, nor science in general, does
Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).
Plantinga, The Ontological Argument (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books [Doubleday], 1965).
8
For a sample, see the essays collected in The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader,
ed. James F. Sennett (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1998).
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anything of the sort. This is just the latest sounding of a theme that I
suggested is the dominant theme in his work, namely, his address to the
multi-faceted charge that theistic belief is irrational.
Al’s so-called evolutionary argument against philosophical naturalism
pours salt into the wound.9 Not only does evolutionary theory, plausibly interpreted, not provide reason for thinking that theism is false. Al
has moved from defense to offense to argue that someone who embraces
the broad outlines of evolutionary theory is not justified in believing that
naturalism is true. What does survival of the fittest have to do with the
truth of that complex philosophical position which is naturalism? My
own view is that Al is here tapping into the fact that for many present-day
secularists, evolutionary theory is their religious alternative to theism.
Hence the anger.
I turn to my final point. When discussing Al’s essay “Reason and Belief
in God,” I mentioned that his argument for the falsehood of the evidentialist thesis concerning theistic belief came in two parts. The first part
consisted of observing that if classical foundationalism is true, then so
too is evidentialism; and then arguing that classical foundationalism is in
fact false. But to show that this argument for evidentialism is untenable
is, of course, not to show that evidentialism itself is untenable. Al’s reason
for holding that evidentialism is in fact untenable was that it doesn’t fit
the cases. He observed that religious believers sometimes believe things
about God not on the basis of propositional evidence but because some
experience has evoked the belief in them immediately—perhaps one of
the experiences to which Kant pointed, of the starry heavens above or of
the moral law within. Al then insisted that in at least some of these cases,
there is nothing epistemologically deficient about the belief. It’s not only
basic but proper—properly basic. He acknowledged that there are philosophers who would dispute his claim that such immediately held religious
beliefs are proper; many of these will be hostile to religion, some may not
be. But he went on to argue that when a philosopher sets about trying to
formulate a criterion for one concept or another, in the last resort he or she
has no choice but to go by his or her own reflective judgments about the
cases. And that’s what he was doing.
Coming to the surface here is an understanding of what one might call
“the epistemology of philosophy” that runs throughout Al’s work. Usually this understanding has remained implicit; in his Notre Dame inaugural address of November 4, 1983, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” it
became fully explicit.10 Let me explain this understanding by contrasting
it with what seems to have been Kant’s understanding of the epistemology of philosophy.
9
See “Is Naturalism Irrational?” chap. 12 in Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); reprinted in Sennett, The Analytic Theist.
10
The address, originally published in Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984): 253–271, is reprinted
in Sennett, The Analytic Theist.

264

Faith and Philosophy

Late in The Critique of Pure Reason Kant drew a distinction between
what he called revelational theology (theologia revelata) and what he called
rational theology (A 631 = B 659). Rational theology, says Kant, is based
“solely upon reason.” Though Kant does not explain what it is for a theology to be based solely upon reason, from his subsequent identification
and description of various forms of theology that he regards as based
solely upon reason, in contrast to those not so based, I think one can make
a reliable inference. Theology is based solely upon reason, and is thus rational theology, just in case it is based solely on premises and inferences
that all cognitively competent adult human beings would accept if those
premises and reasons were presented to them, if they understood them,
if they possessed the relevant background information, and if they freely
reflected on them at sufficient length. (What constitutes sufficient length is,
of course, a nice question.) For the sake of convenience, let me call this sort
of rationality Kant-rationality.
Though I have extracted the idea of Kant-rationality from the passage in
the Pure Critique in which Kant distinguishes various kinds of theology,
it’s obvious that the idea has application to the academic disciplines in
general, and in particular, to philosophy. A body of philosophical thought
possesses Kant-rationality just in case it is based solely on premises and
inferences that all cognitively competent adult human beings would accept if those premises and reasons were presented to them, if they understood them, if they possessed the relevant background information, and if
they freely reflected on them at sufficient length. A body of philosophical
thought that possesses Kant-rationality will be foundationalist in structure; but since it’s not required that the basis be limited to necessary
truths that are self-evident and to contingent truths that are incorrigible,
it will not be classically foundationalist in structure. Whereas the classical
foundationalist wants a foundation that is certain, the person who aims
at Kant-rationality wants a foundation that is acceptable to all rational
reflective human beings—this being spelled out in the way indicated.
I interpret Kant as holding that philosophy should aim at Kant-rationality
and that this is an achievable aim; it’s my impression that he regarded his
own philosophy as having achieved that aim, at least for the most part.
Jürgen Habermas, in his writings over the past couple of decades, has described his own philosophy as “post-metaphysical.” When one looks to
see what he has in mind by that, it becomes clear that central to what is
definitive of what he calls “post-metaphysical philosophy” is that it possess
Kant-rationality.
Let me now stick my neck out: I think that most philosophers in the
modern period have thought that we should aim at Kant-rationality in
our practice of philosophy, and that this aim is in principle achievable. We
should not expect that it will ever in fact be fully achieved; but aiming at
it is not like banging one’s head against a concrete wall. Those who implicitly or explicitly understand themselves as aiming at Kant-rationality
are understandably shy of explaining just why there are philosophers who
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disagree with them on philosophical points. Is it because they’re not cognitively competent, or because they don’t fully understand the issues, or
because they haven’t thought about the matter long enough, or because their
reflections are in some way not free? All the explanations seem insulting.
Running throughout Al’s career, but coming to the surface most explicitly in his inaugural address, is a very different understanding of the epistemology of philosophy. We must face up to the fact that it’s an illusion
to suppose that Kant-rationality is achievable for any substantial body of
philosophical thought; over and over it turns out that philosophers who are
fully rational find themselves in deep disagreement. The advice Al gives to
Christian philosophers presupposes his rejection of Kant-rationality as the
epistemology of philosophy; it’s clear that he would give the same sort of
advice to philosophers of other persuasions.
One enters philosophy as who one is, committed as one is committed,
believing what one does believe on matters religious and otherwise; and
one participates in the philosophical dialogue taking place. The secular
humanist participates as a secular humanist, the Jewish person as Jewish,
the secular naturalist as a secular naturalist, the Christian as a Christian.
One listens carefully to one’s fellow philosophers who contend that one’s
commitments are misguided, one’s beliefs defective, one’s philosophical
conclusions mistaken. On some matters, large or small, one finds their
arguments cogent; on other matters, large or small, one does not. One
then retains the commitments, beliefs, and conclusions one already had,
perhaps refined by the fuller’s fire through which they have gone. What
else is one to do? One can’t just choose no longer to believe what one did
believe. And to those fellow philosophers whose commitments one finds
misguided, whose beliefs one finds defective, whose philosophical conclusions one finds mistaken, one offers them arguments to that effect. One
hopes they will find those arguments compelling. But one fully expects
that often they will not. And so it goes, back and forth.
What does one say to the philosopher who has listened carefully to the
arguments and counter-arguments and remains, or becomes, a convinced
secular naturalist? What else can one say but to your deepest commitments and convictions be true as you engage in dialogue with your fellow
philosophers on philosophical issues? Be a naturalist philosopher. Show
the rest of us where naturalist thinking goes. Perhaps something will turn
up that we can appropriate in our own way. And what does one say to the
philosopher who has listened carefully to the arguments and counterarguments and remains, or becomes, a convinced Christian? What else
can one say but to your deepest commitments and convictions be true as
you engage in dialogue with your fellow philosophers on philosophical
issues? Be a Christian philosopher. Show those who are of other persuasions where Christian thinking goes. Perhaps something will turn up that
they can appropriate in their own way.
If the philosophical enterprise, on this way of understanding it, does not
aim at Kant-rationality, what does it aim at? It aims at what I call dialogic
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rationality. This is not the occasion for me to explain what I mean by that;
the term is sufficiently suggestive for the present.
Throughout his career Al has been a Christian philosopher, aiming not
at Kant-rationality but at dialogic rationality; his work in its totality is a
paradigm of what that is. To what extent has the paradigm been influential
on how philosophers in general understand the philosophical enterprise?
That’s hard to tell, since analytic philosophers are curiously inarticulate
when it comes to formulating their understanding of the epistemology of
philosophy. It is my impression, however, that the ideal of Kant-rationality
is dying. My Harvard professors would have looked askance at the idea of
Christian philosophy, humanist philosophy, feminist philosophy, or any
other such perspectival philosophy. They would have dismissed them all
as different versions of biased philosophy; good philosophy is generically
human philosophy. It’s my impression that the recognition that good philosophy comes in various adjectival or perspectival forms is well on the
way to being the common self-understanding of the analytic philosopher.
I grew up in Minnesota, where hyperbole was the primal rhetorical evil,
not one among the rhetorical tropes at one’s disposal. On every pencil box,
on every ink well, were written the words, “Thou shalt not exaggerate.”
In my remarks I have tried to be faithful to my Minnesota upbringing.
Philosophy in general, and Christian philosophy in particular, is very different now from what it was then. And Al Plantinga, my good friend of a
good many years, has played a leading role in making it so. It’s my view
that philosophy is in a much better state now than it was then, and that
Christian philosophy in particular is in a much better state. So when I say
that Al has played a leading role in making the field what it is today, I mean
those words as an expression of gratitude. I speak not only for myself but
for many others when I say that we are grateful for the extraordinary contribution he has made to our field. And as for me personally: I am deeply
grateful for the personal and philosophical friendship that he and I have
enjoyed over these sixty years. It’s been a fascinating journey, much of it
over terrain hitherto unknown, never before explored, but now, thanks to
his work, familiar.
Yale University

